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Abstract
The research will focus on the discussion of the ways in which the top-down nature of Safety
Management Systems (SMS) can be used to create „Just Culture‟ within the aviation
industry. Specific focus will be placed on an aviation program conducted by an accredited
university, with the institution in focus being the midwest aviation training program. To this
end, a variety of different aspects of safety culture in aviation and aviation management will
be considered. The focus on the implementation strategies vital for the existence of a „Just
Culture‟ within the aviation industry in general, and particularly within the aforementioned
institution‟s aerospace program. Some ideas and perspectives will be subsequently suggested
and designed for implementation, within the institution‟s program.
The aspect of enhancing the overall safety output gained, from the institution, as per
standards set within the greater American Aviation industry will be examined. Overall, the
paper will seek to showcase the vital importance of implementing the SMS standardization
model in the institution‟s Aerospace program, while providing some areas of concern. Such
concerns will be based on a number of issues, which are pertinent to the overall enhancement
of the institution‟s observance of aviation safety. This will be both in general application of
an SMS, as well as personalized/ specific applications in areas in need of improvement.
Overall, through the paper, the author hopes to provide a better understanding of the
institution‟s placement, with regard to not only aviation safety, but also the implementation
of an effective „Just Culture‟ within the program.

x

Chapter One: Introduction
1.0 Introduction
Safety Management Systems has its acronym as SMS. It pertains to the utility
of various comprehensive management systems in the sector of business, or any other
pertinent arenas, where safety elements are of a primary concern. As a business
approach towards safety, its major focuses on an explicit, comprehensive and
systematic process. The process is tasked with the maintenance and management of
various forms of potential safety risks. As with all other forms of management
systems, SMS in the Aviation sector provides for various forms of procedural
measures. Such measures include planning (policy formulation) and goal setting, in
addition to the measurement of overall performance. Through its interwoven nature,
with the prevailing fabric of the aviation industry, it hence forms part of the
organizational culture present.
Safety therefore seeks the reduction of overall risk levels, to the lowest
practical levels possible. Three imperatives are presented, toward adopting a business
sector‟s SMS. These regard the financial, legal and ethical aspects of such a business
sector. The latter, refers to an implicit moral obligation on an employer‟s part. This is
towards ensuring that the various pertinent work activities, as well as the work area/
environment of work are safe (Gain Working Group, 2004). Legally, various
legislative requirements do exist, with regard to the legal jurisdiction of law
formulation. Safety has a directly related consequence on an organizations overall
financial exposure. This is through either a reduction or increase, directly or
indirectly, of financial obligations, costs and expenditures, in relation to either
incidents and/ or accidents.

Just Culture is a relatively new development in management theory,
particularly in corporate workplaces. This is a concept of defined values, set of beliefs
or norms concerning important issues, how to act, and the behavioral options and
resolutions appropriate in relation to incidences of error. In the past as Vietti –Cook
(2011) allude, many workplaces have operated under the mutual understanding that
employees will not inform or report to authorities or management about situations or
conditions that require improvement. In some cases, these conditions or situations
may be merely irritating to workers or employees, but in other cases, the conditions of
the workplace may be actively dangerous to employees or the public. In workplaces
that do not promote just culture, employees rarely report errors, whether they are
errors committed by the individual or his or her coworker. Historically, safety culture
and Just Culture stemmed from the disaster at Chernobyl. This is because of the
massive loss of life that was sustained based on a series of failures at the site. As a
result, new policies were created and implemented to ensure that similar disasters
could be avoided in the future (Vietti-Cook, 2011).
In the absence of just culture, the culture that is established in workplaces can
be best accurately described as blame culture. This is a concept of defined values, set
of beliefs or norms concerning work ethics in relation to incidences of error such that
people are unwilling to accept liability for faults owing to a dread of prosecution or
criticism. In some workplaces, blame culture can and is at times innocuous. However,
in industries like aviation or medicine, attempts to sweep mistakes aside or cover
them up can be disastrous and can cost millions of dollars and people's lives (Filn &
Mearns et al., 2000).The aviation industry continues to grow, both in scope and
magnitude, and will continue to grow as long as globalizing forces continue to work
2

upon human society. Safety Management Systems (SMS) is one type of managerial
approach to the problem of the growing complexity of the aviation industry.
Cooper (2000), states that SMS implements a linear, tiered approach to
implementation of safety culture. Implementing SMS in the aviation industry is
indeed a complex process. However, one of the first and most important steps entails
both the documentation and the creation of an atmosphere of trust. Encouraging an
environment where people are rewarded for providing essential, safety-related
information is therefore intricately and inextricably related to the issue of Safety
Management Systems. Consequently, without trust in the system, as well as the safety
net of just culture, the Safety Management Systems of any given organization can
easily collapse. Maintaining safety considerations in the face of commercial and
financial advancement is one of the major focuses of the aviation industry today
(Cooper, 2000). This is particularly as a result of the post-September 11 commercial
aviation environment in the United States.
1.1 Background to the Problem
Pertaining to „just culture‟, in reference to the aviation industry. It is traceable
from the early 1990s, being a step towards replacing the majorly punitive cultures that
were prevalent then. However to be noted is that these „non-blame cultures‟ are rare
in occurrence or implementation. This is due to the prevailing aspect of „the blame‟
culture. The latter, is persistent due to the common occurrence of the „criminalization
of error (human).‟ This fundamentally contributes to the prevailing nature of
adversarial relationships, at times witnessed in the greater global aviation industry.
The problem emanates from the fact that this aspect may potentially influence the
resulting inquiry. This is through its greater role-play with regard to getting the truth.
3

Consequently, various versions of the truth may emerge. These may be especially on
the basis of following particular agendas i.e. the limitation of corporate liability or
even evading jail sentences amongst others.

1.2 Problem statement
The aspect of just culture, with regard to Safety Management Systems in the
aviation industry, continues being a highly debatable issue. This is especially due to
the fact that the „Blame Culture‟ still plays a crucial role, regarding incident/ accident
investigations, as well as the prosecution cases. It is crucial to recognize the fact that
presence of incidences and/ or accidents, in the aviation industry cannot all be
attributed to human error (SKYGUIDE, 2003).The legal fraterni ty holds the opinion
that systems present are inherently safe, and that it is human beings who pose the
main threat to safety. Consequently, it will still take some time before „human error‟
is accepted as a justifiable variable. Regarding the Aviation industry‟s overall safety
and pertinent SMSs, the researcher finds it vital to establish whether human error is
unavoidable. This is possible to attain through design, which is outside the prevailing
systems present.
Thus, as Ruitenberg (2001) provides, the aspect of „Just Culture‟ is necessary,
with human error being a crucial element that is normal to all human beings, even
those who are most disciplined. Regarding „just culture‟, the background information
of an individual is crucial when implementing the aforementioned SMSs. This is due
to the fact that general accountability is only possible if there is present a workable
solution. This pertains to the greater aim of reconstructing mechanisms which hold
4

individuals accountable. This is especially when evidence proves the same, the
„blame-free atmosphere‟ present notwithstanding.
Research will be conducted into the safety culture and adherence to the safety
standards set. These are within the collegiate aviation program, with special attention
being paid to the perceptions of safety culture. Perceptions of safety culture will be
gained from flight instructors who have successfully completed the program, and who
are therefore responsible for overseeing the program. An analysis of the SMS for the
university aviation among students was conducted. In addition, a comparison between
the ideal construction of a Just Culture in an aviation program and the actual safety
culture will be examined.
1.3 Research Aim and Pertinent aspects
A number of variables are present, i.e. The gender and age of an individual,
which inadvertently do contribute to whether „Just Culture‟ can be adequately cited
(Ruitenberg, 2001). Further still, are the following variables i.e. academic
qualifications, the specific area of interest (educational major/ minor), an individual‟s
grade point average and his/ her career goals. Of vital importance, with respect to the
aforementioned, as pertaining to human contributions and/ or the supposed failure of
aviation SMSs, are other aspects. These are crucial towards enhancing „Just culture‟,
as opposed to the inherently prevalent „Blame culture.‟ Pertinent to this, would be the
greater engagement on issues related to safety, as discussed regularly at various
midwest aviation training program aerospace classes and meetings.
In addition is the need for the Midwest Aviation Training Program Aerospace
program, to regularly identify various safety concerns, especially those in need of
5

urgent attention. The implementation of pertinent and effective preventative actions
follows next in the process. This is towards negating the overall effects of existing
„blame culture‟. The fact that accidents do occur, does call for a serious review of all
prevailing contexts, pertaining especially to the „what and why reasons‟ of the
accident, as opposed to the „who caused/ failed‟ aspect (Churchill, 2003). As a
measure, the present deans, the safety department, Directors of Flight Operations, as
well as the Chair of Academics, genuinely concerned and hence committed to
ensuring greater safety in the aviation sector. This can be achieved by way of ensuring
the provision of adequate resources and expertise, which are crucial to the upholding
of aviation safety as the safety is not a duty of someone or a group inside an
organization but in fact everyone have to contribute and take safety as his or her
responsibility. In addition, the Aerospace program officials do require continues
review of their ideals and policies (Ruitenberg, 2001). These are based on having a
genuine goal of minimum level of mishaps, as is showcased by top management at the
Midwest Aviation Training Program.
The program in general, as Bayuk (2007) alludes, should provide various
avenues of encouraging individual and group-entity reporting of various issues
affecting aviation safety in. Such a reporting system should be augmented by
confidential and non-punitive measures. These do accidentally affect, and therefore
influence the kind of disciplinary policies that should be subsequently enforced. There
hence is a need to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable behavior, as only
a small percentage of unsafe actions/ acts are as a result of recklessness. Such actions
commonly do deserve punitive measures. However, a majority of incidences, events
and accidents are notably un-intentional and hence are not liable for punishment
6

(Bayuk, 2007). This paper therefore aims at establishing a clear system of safety
culture in the aviation industry taking into consideration the existing just and blames
cultures. It hopes to give a solution to the existent blame culture.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
2.0 Introduction
Generally, companies whose operations expose employees to risks have a
responsibility to maintain an active safety system or program. These companies
mainly are inclusive of service, manufacturing and mining organizations. However,
safety is paramount in any organization, its myriad of activities notwithstanding. This
essay will discuss the prevailing safety culture and Safety Management Systems
(SMS) found in the aviation industry. Over the years, the aviation industry has
maintained high safety standards as indicated by minimal occurrences of accidents or
incidents (Stolzer&Halford, 2011). However, in spite of this encouraging trend, the
industry still does encourage the establishment of SMS, and a just organizational
culture among all Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs).
2.1 Definitions
Many researchers have attempted to define both culture and SMS. In fact, as
Soeters & Boer (2010) portray, there are many definitions, as recorded in research
studies carried out by varying analysts in the previous century. The most
comprehensive of these, are those that capture the essence of existing organizational
culture encapsulating all values, beliefs and behaviors; notable across all the levels of
a given

organization. A „Just Culture‟ therefore, comprises of pertinent unique

features such as trust, the lack of unjustified blame, steady and timely response to
criminal and negligible activities. This is in addition to the prevailing the reward
system, especially on the aspect of reporting near misses, regarding incidents or
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accidents (Soeters & Boer, 2010). In other words, a just culture is built on integrity,
consistency and commitment to achieve the desired results of absolute safety to
passengers. As Denison (1996) states, both safety standards and organizational
cultures can be used interchangeably to portray the same thing.
On the other hand, Safety Management Systems are strategic formulations in
the air transportation industry, which facilitate the smooth implementation of safety
measures. They involve pertinent procedures, in addition to a well-structured system
of management of security measures undertaken within the organization (Denison,
1996). The SMS cannot work efficiently unless a safety culture has been established
across the organization. For example, for SMS to succeed there is need for both the
employees and the management present, to be made aware of existing safety
measures. In addition; is the need to comprehend and feel encouraged towards
practicing SMS measures. These are the vital components that ought to, and
subsequently need to be entrenched in a company culture.
Understanding the formulation of safety and just culture is the fundamental
basis for analysis of the culture in an accredited aviation program. According to
Parker, Lawrie, and Hudson (2006), there are a few requirements for an effective
safety culture within an organization. They are of the suggestion that an organization
with an effective safety culture ought to: • have a safety information system that collects, analyzes and disseminates
information from incidents and near misses, as well as from regular proactive checks
on the system; this promotes efficiency and transparency in operations. The collection
and dissemination of information also helps enhance safety among personnel.
9

• have an efficient and effective reporting culture, where people are prepared to report
their errors, mistakes and violations; this helps an organization track its performance
and formulate efficient disciplinary actions for those who violate the standards.
• have a culture of trust where people are encouraged and even rewarded to provide
essential safety-related information. Pertinently so is that there is need for a clear
distinction, with regard to acceptable and unacceptable behavior; this describes just
culture.
• be flexible, in terms of the ability to reconfigure the organizational structure present
in the face of a dynamic and demanding task environment;
• have the willingness and competence, to draw the right conclusions from its safety
system, in addition to being willing to implement reform when it is required. (Parker,
Lawrie& Hudson, 2006).
Essentially, safety culture and Just Culture is core environments in which
existing authorities do reward, not only the noticing of mistakes, but also the
subsequent reporting. This is through the provision of information on potentially
dangerous situations, rather than the aspect of punishment (Parker, Lawrie & Hudson,
2006). The GAIN Working Group (2004), suggest a similar ideal:- that the rewarding
of employees for their recognition of mistakes, in addition to rectifying them at an
early stage, is a much better solution and method. This is especially true in managing
employees, rather than a punishment-based system. This is particularly true in the
aviation industry, according to the GAIN report (2004). In addition, the GAIN report
(2004) suggests that creating a Just Culture promotes an environment where everyone
involved in the situation learns from potentially unsafe acts or mistakes. This is as
10

opposed to an environment where potentially unsafe acts or mistakes become
compounded by individuals, assigning blame and covering up their mistakes (GAIN
Working Group, 2004).
To be noted is that Safety Culture and Just Culture, are not synonymous.
According to Cox & Cheyne (2000), a culture of safety is something that can be
achieved through the creation of a just culture. Thus, although the two concepts are
intricately linked, they are not synonymous, as they do indicate to varying ideals.
When a Just Culture is created within a given organization, the resulting blame-free
environment improves the overall safety standards present. This is due to the increase
in the willingness of employees to actively participate in the reporting of unwarranted
and hence dangerous (reckless) behaviors (Cox & Cheyne, 2000).
The creation of a Just Culture within an organization also requires a positive
outcome for noticing errors and mistakes that are recorded. Cooper (2000) notes that
managerial roles in the creation of a Just Culture are fundamentally important. Thus,
those in managerial positions must be goal-oriented and very clear with the actions
and steps requisite towards creating a just culture within a given organization.
Essentially, the creation of a just culture, does require the establishment of new and
adequate behavioral norms. This is with regard to individuals acting within a certain
environment; authority figures within such an environment must set realistic and
subsequently attainable goals (Cooper, 2000).
2.2 Features of a Just Safety Culture in Aviation
To attain a steady feature of a just safety culture, there should be some
appearances to shape the features. First, it should be extensively informed from data
11

collection and analysis. Employees should honestly report accidents and near miss
incidents. The accuracy of data collected is crucial in gauging the success rate of
proactive safety measures, against the rate of accidents reported. Second, employees
should be made comfortable when reporting on issues of safety incidences
(Eurocontrol, 2006). Third, the culture must be fair in encouraging employee
participation, as well as positive contributions. Fairness involves the absence of
automatic blame, and the adherence to quick responses to any criminal or safety
issues arising within a given setting. Finally, a competent safety culture ought to be
flexible enough to accommodate change arising from unforeseen external factors.
These include technological advancements, vis-à-vis the obsolete nature of earlier
technologies. All these features enable managers to learn, draw conclusions and
implement alternative procedures or equipment aimed at improving safety in the
aviation industry (Eurocontrol, 2006).
2.3 Purpose of Culture and SMS in Aviation Industries
The importance of these systems cannot be overemphasized especially in the
aviation industry. This is indicated by the influx of researchers who have dedicated
their time and effort relentlessly to the study of these fields. Moreover, the industry
itself is encouraging all the ANSPs to embrace safety culture and SMS.
SMS and Safety Culture are supposed to culminate in special behavioral
norms across the whole organization. These norms are crucial for the continuity of the
existing standards of safety within a given organization. Additionally, safety culture
should be able to reduce accidents and injuries by a considerable extent. Otherwise,
the competency of such a culture would be considered questionable as Cooper (2000),
provides. A given culture will also place the necessary importance to safety issues that
12

would necessitate corresponding attention from all employees present within a given
organization. Moreover, this culture must provide protection for employees from
common risks, hazards, and ill-health as entrenched in the company‟s ideas and
beliefs. Culture and SMS, thus do play a major role in identifying the style and
efficiency of the company‟s safety criteria. Largely, the overall role of both systems is
towards achieving the minimum level of accidents (Cooper, 2000).
Safety Management Systems (SMS) in the aviation industry, as Ferguson &
Nelson (2013) allude, are designed to reduce overall levels of threat and risk, while
carrying out the necessary processes in the aviation industry. Therefore, SMS in the
aviation industry need to create the basic framework of a safety culture within the
organization. In addition, it should strive towards the promotion of a transparent and
effective reporting environment for individuals who are working within the
environment (Ferguson & Nelson, 2013). The GAIN report (2004), notes that there
are potential pitfalls to an SMS that promotes a confidential reporting culture.
However, the potential problems that may arise from such a reporting system are
vastly outweighed by the amount of information and knowledge that can be gained
from a mandatory reporting system. There are difficulties, however, with regard to
the aspect of validation. This is especially so, when reporting systems are confidential
in nature. This is due to the fact that confidential reporting systems often make it
difficult to properly assess and manage information (GAIN Working Group, 2013).
2.4 Creating and Implementing a Just Culture
While there are clear benefits in creating a just culture, these entail both legal
and logistical undertakings. Thus, there exist two conflicting theories on the ways in
which a sustainable Just or safety culture can be created within an organization. The
13

traditional “Top-down” method for SMS and Just Culture is effective. This is due to
the fact that it provides employees with clear definitions of acceptable and
unacceptable behavior (Filn & Mearns et al., 2000). A „Top-down‟ approach is one in
which a system is broken down in quest for insight about its subs-systems. Dekker
(2009) suggests that in a top-down approach, incidents that occur “must not be seen as
a failure or a crisis, neither by management, nor by colleagues. An incident is a free
lesson, a great opportunity to focus attention and to learn collectively.” This
atmosphere of collective learning, according to Dekker, must be established and
encouraged by the authorities within an organization.
Conversely, Hudson (2007) examines a major multinational corporation that
approached the issue of SMS and Just Culture differently. Hudson (2007) writes:
“Once top management had provided the initial support for the development of a
more advanced safety culture, a number of supporting tools were developed, under the
Hearts and Minds brand, and a strategy for implementation was developed that relied
more on bottom-up „pull‟ rather than top-down „push‟ – the standard implementation
model for new initiatives. The tools were designed to provide a clear direction, a road
map to an advanced culture defined in terms provided by people within the industry,
to support lasting changes in attitudes and beliefs, to promote an increased feeling of
control when solving HSE-specific problems – all components of a more advanced
culture.” (Hudson, 2007).
In a similar vein, Antonsen (2009) suggests that power and the potential for
abuse of power plays an important role in the creation of a Just Culture and Safety
Management Systems. While safety culture in its ideal form is free from conflict and
14

free from punishment for errors made in earnest, in reality, society assigns blame. He
further argues that power and blame often do play a vital role in the breakdown of
safety culture in large organizations (Antonsen, (2009).
Dekker (2009), suggests that the line between legitimate and illegitimate
behavior in a Just Culture is a judgment rather than a clear delineation between right
and wrong. He further suggests that the pull method of creation is inadvisable,
because someone must be given the ability to make judgments on the definition of
legitimate and illegitimate behavior in a Just Culture. Similarly, he takes note of the
fact that a culture, which is blame-free should not be confused with a culture that is
accountability-free. Safety management systems that are accountability-free are not
effective in their overall ability to negate risk (Dekker, 2009).
2.5 Models of Just Culture in Aviation Organization
Several models have been proposed by researchers to explain how the safety
culture works. Successfully tested models dwell on the interaction between
“behavioral, situational and psychological” factors that lead to the occurrence of
accidents within an organization. Other factors considered when constructing a model
are espoused in the basic assumptions found within an organization, towards security
culture. In fact, assumptions are the most arduous factors to influence in a safety
culture. Models should also involve external signs traceable by outsiders. These
models can also be used to analyze or assess the success of a safety culture. Through
models, the goals of the system should clearly be set to ensure focus (Eurocontrol,
2006).

15

2.6 Effective Methods of Reporting in Just Culture
Most literature present, suggests that a Just Culture requires open and blamefree communication strategies to maintain the integrity of the safety culture.
However, the logistical issues that arise when considering the blame-free environment
are problematic, and thus are handled differently by a variety of existing researchers.
Wagner (2013), suggests that anonymous and confidential reporting are both
extremely important tools for use in creating a safety culture within an organization.
He further suggests that confidential reporting in particular encourages active learning
in employees and members of the organization (Wagner, 2013).Dekker (2009) on his
part, notes that active learning is a fundamental underlying purpose in the creation of
a safety culture within a given organization (Dekker, 2009).
The GAIN report (2004) suggests that mandatory reporting of events by
Danish air traffic controllers has vastly reduced the number of incidents that have
occurred. The knowledge that reports must be made and filed, has improved the
attention paid to details by the air traffic controllers. The report, notes the important
difference between blameless and non-punitive organizational just culture. However,
reporters are ensured of their indemnity against unjust (blame-based) prosecution or
disciplinary actions against them. This is for any events that they may, or have
reported, especially those based on the information contained in the reports they may
have submitted.

However, this does not always mean that such reports can be

submitted without any consequences” (GAIN Working Group, 2004).
Mandatory reporting, according to the report, has been utilized effectively, in
the aviation industry to great success. In addition, when mandatory reporting is used
in conjunction with confidential reporting, incident levels do have a tendency of
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decreasing. The new system for Danish air traffic controllers also allows authorities
to train individuals to both assess and further produce their reports. This is done
through by prioritizing reports; those, which require urgent attention are addressed
first. The culture of trust that this system created as a result, was able to permeate the
entire air-traffic control chain of command. It thus allowed existing air traffic
controllers to address existing problems earlier, and with less fear of punishment from
figures of authority (GAIN Working Group, 2004).
Glendon and Stanton (2000), suggest that reporting methods should be
quantitative in nature, as well as qualitative, for the maximum efficacy of the reports.
They further suggest that the measurement of existing safety culture, does depend on
its definition. The prevailing definition in turn, reflects the perspective adopted within
a given organizational culture. This measurement is not merely empirical, but it rests
upon a value decision. As a result, ethnographic approaches, while being possibly the
most valid form an interpretive perspective, are often costly and time consuming in
nature. Case study data reported here, showed that two existing and independent
measures did reveal existing safety improvements over time. This was as reflected in
the patterns of behavior and working practices, as found within an existing
organizational environment (Glendon & Stanton, 2009).
The convergence of existing data, from the different methodologies utilized, is
most likely to improve both the breath and subsequent accuracy. However, the
direction and resulting influences, of such prevailing „cause and effect‟ situational
contexts, cannot necessarily be established from their analysis. It may thus be
summarized, in the fact that observed changes, if present in both measures, do reflect
the prevailing corresponding changes. These are as found in the underlying aspects of
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the prevailing safety culture (Glendon & Stanton, 2009). They are of the suggestion
that such methods of quantitative analysis, do provide those in authority with more
accurate and hence concrete knowledge of safety measures and analysis, within a
given organization.
2.7 Measurement of Success of Safety Culture and SMS
As Guldenmund (2000) declares, there exist both quantitative and qualitative
measures on data, vital in determining the overall competence of a given safety
culture. Quantitative measures do cover the total number of accidents and injuries
reported to the risk manager of the organization. Qualitative measures on the other
hand, pertain to the measure of faith, which existing employees have in the system,
with regard to their safety within the given organization. Data can be gained through
the conduct of interviews, and visiting the organization, or by studying security and
safety data recorded in the company. As a result, the aviation industry has benefited
immensely, from such measures of competence (Guldenmund, 2000). This is because
crucial information i.e. ways of improving the system, as well as effective factors, can
be identified and necessary action taken thereafter. This is the point where risk
managers can and ought to apply corrective measures.
2.8 Diagnosis of Safety Culture in Aviation Safety Management Audits
The socio-technical systems approach, provides an avenue through which the
interplay of technology, an organization and people is presented. This is through an
understanding of the prevailing safety culture. Efforts are thus focused primarily on
both individual-centered and technical measures, as well as the integral safety
management. This regards the improvement of overall interplay, of the
aforementioned pertinent organizational factors. Latent errors, as Reason (1993)
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provides, refer to faulty management decisions. These do endanger the optimal
functioning of a given socio-technical system. These are through the increase of the
potential occurrence of errors, and thus are at the core of assessments based on safetyrelated systems. With regard to the aviation industry, the presence of high safety
margins provides for a re-evaluation of the prevailing systems. This is fundamental in
not only identifying such errors of management, but also the retracing of causal chain
of incidents and accidents, with the aim of forecasting potential future errors.
The prevailing organizational value systems are evaluated with respect to
existing contexts of safety culture. Various indicators are utilized towards assessing
an organization‟s overall safety culture. Inclusive in these value systems are: - safety
motivation and training; the organizational management‟s commitment to overall
safety; accident and incidents record keeping, as well as adequate maintenance and
operation procedures (Reason, 1993). In addition, there is good house-keeping;
sufficient communication and inspection; safety rules and committees, and technical
equipment/ systems, which should be both functional and well designed.
Unfortunately, most major problems with such models are associated with the lack of
optimal integration into existing models of both an organization and its inherent
organizational culture. Thus, with safety being perceived as an aspect that may be
considered outside the socio-technical system of a given organization, such a context
provides cause for worry.
As Jacobs and Haber (1994) allude, the organization and the safety culture
need to be interconnected and interrelated for optimal outcomes. This is especially
with regard to aviation safety and overall management. Organizational culture, refers
to the deeply entrenched assumptions pertaining to social relations, human interaction
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and inherent human nature that are shared between a given organization‟s work-force.
It is generally an exhibition of the prevailing behavioral patterns, artifacts (working
environment) and values present within such an organization. These need to interact
positively with the existing system‟s general characteristics, as well as related safety
aspects. In order to avoid some of the aforementioned problems, there is need to
distinguish between an organization‟s cultural framework, and its prevailing safety
culture, as distinct yet parallel dimensions (Jacobs & Haber, 1994). The latter
encompasses an organization‟s general transparency, mechanisms of coordination and
conflict management, as well as decision-making that are centralized.
The presence of a link as Susmann (1976) provides, between the aviation
industry‟s organizational design, to both safety culture and management, provides a
key avenue where general aviation safety and management are enhanced. This is in
regard to the „socio-technical model of safety culture. Regarding this model, two core
assumptions are prevalent, i.e. first, that both the working system‟s social and
technical subsystems need to be optimized jointly, so as to enhance maximum
efficiency. This is aimed at allowing the maximization of efficiency, especially
towards accomplishing the given system‟s core task/ role-play. Secondly, is that for
greater optimization of the joint effort, the prevailing system needs to have the
capacity to control the existing variables, especially at their source of origin. The first
assumption provides critical support to the core aspect of safety management i.e.
conflict resolution, which is proactively carried out, especially between a given
organization‟s safety goals and its overall productivity.
System efficiency is achieved through better definition of such a system‟s core
task/ role-play, especially regarding production safety, quality and quantity of work
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done. The second assumption bases its argument on the fact that greater enhancement
of work self-regulation, with regard to work teams present is indeed beneficial to
overall safety (Susmann, 1976). As Grote (1997) provides, the basis of this argument
is that the delegation of control is crucial in complex organizational systems. Here,
immediate action and reactions, especially to prevailing disturbances and variations
require anticipatory actions to prevent further harm, damage and inconvenience. In
addition, an individual worker‟s motivation is enhanced with the presence of a higher
degree of autonomy. This is especially in regard to task feedback and completeness.
This is rooted in the motivation model, as entrenched in a given organization‟s sociotechnical approach system. An individual, when performing a primary task, becomes
motivated more towards overall safety if the task includes safety, as well as action
efficiency.
The presence of higher degrees of system automation, partnered with lower
human job autonomy, has been linked to technology as the most probable risk factor.
Conversely, greater job autonomy and lesser degrees of system automation, allude to
human error/ omission as the major high risk factor (Grote, 1997). The rigid
combination of systems, even with minor limitations, provides for case scenarios
where the decentralization of such systems becomes limited. To gain the optimal
working environment, as Agnew and Daniels (2010) allude, there should be
enhancement of both optimal human autonomy, as well as system combination. This
is requisite in providing greater flexibility with regard to the switch between the
different pertinent degrees of system centralization. Through greater linkage of an
entity‟s safety management, the inherent socio-technical systems and overall
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organizational culture are crucial in overcoming the shortfalls of various safety
culture models.
Fundamental to the achievement of the above is the need to conceptualize
overall safety culture outside the limitations given above. This is done by focusing not
only on the directly observable characteristics, but more into the prevailing invisible
assumptions and norms (Agnew & Daniels, 2010). As Schein (1992) provides, these
are based on the knowledge of such assumptions, as well as external agents such as
insurers and regulatory agencies carrying out norms providing meaning to safetyrelated evaluations. However, two sets of difficulties arise, which need be addressed.
First, the evaluations mentioned are constrained in terms of both time and resources.
Secondly, the relationship between the evaluating parties and the organization to be
evaluated; whether the relationship founded in the organization more on control and
regulations, or based on trust and or equality.
It is the presence of such conditions, which inadvertently interfere with the
enhancing overall safety. The concept of safety culture is therefore severely curtailed.
This is with regard to performing in-depth studies on a given organization by way of
management audits. It is due to the fact that such activities often do require, and are
hence based on qualitative methodology. Such methodology bases itself on such
aspects as company document analysis, participatory observation and narrative
interviews. The absence of normative frameworks also provides another difficulty,
with regard to cultural approach, when evaluating a given organization‟s safety
concerns (Schein, 1992).
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2.9 A Hierarchical Factor Analysis of a Safety Culture Survey
Organization culture is the topmost factor that adds value to a safe culture.
Dwivedi (1995), defines organizational culture as a system of shared meaning that
distinguishes one organization from another. It further provides the employees have a
clear understanding of how things are done in the organization. An organizations
culture determines the overall behavior of the human resource present. Safety culture
is thus developed as part of the overall organizational culture within a given
organizational entity. A safety culture identifies workplace risks in addition to
addressing them. This is achieved through elimination, mitigation and/or taking
precaution, to prevent them from causing injury. An effective safety culture should
therefore be strong. It is strengthened through the maintenance of clear
communication, based on mutual trust, between both the employees and the
management.
Employee involvement in safety policy formulations, as well as providing
them with the necessary resources for maintaining safety, is important in building an
effective safety culture. The culture should be clearly spelled out for new employees,
so as to be effective. There are three major players in the formulation, implementation
and maintenance of an effective safety culture (Dwivedi, 1995).

They are the

management, employees and the established safety systems. The management is the
policy maker in any organization. It influences the safety culture based on how it
perceives safety, how much it cares for it employees, and should therefore considers
safety as an important priority. It should ensure that the objective of the organization
involves the enforcement of safety behaviors, as Zohar (2000) states. It should be at
the forefront of encouraging productivity as well as the formulation of policies that
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enhance the well-being of all employees present. Loss due to injury could also reason
for the high employee turnover, due to the prevailing work pressure.
The building of a strong safety culture is also an employee‟s personal
responsibility. Employees should be committed to their own safety. Mutual trust that
exists between the employees and the management enhances employee positive
behavior towards safety. Employees should also be committed to the wellbeing of
their fellow employees. They should therefore often congratulate them for safe actions
undertaken, vis-à-vis warning them against risky behavior. Employees should provide
management with feedback on safety in the operation ground. Safety systems involve
all the tools which enhance overall positive safety behavior. These include: communication, training, discipline, reward systems and recognitions. When there is
effective communication on safety issues, proper training of employees is carried out.
Additionally, discipline is clearly spelled out, with both rewarding and punishment
being done fairly. As a result, a positive safety environment is developed (Zohar,
2000).Consequently, every stakeholder does feel that it is his or her responsibility to
maintain positive behavior, which eventually results in a stronger safety culture.

2.10 Framework for Understanding of Organizational Safety Cultures
The article by Christopher et al (2007) is an analysis of a survey conducted to
investigate the factors that contribute to establishment and maintenance of a positive
safety culture. It provides the structure of the factors identified in a hierarchical
manner. According to the article, interviews were carried out to determine structure
that an organization could use to assess its safety culture. These interviews sought to
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describe an organizational culture based on Wesstrum‟s topology of organizational
communication. Five levels of safety culture were developed: pathological, reactive,
calculative, proactive and generative (Christopher et al, 2007).
At the pathological level, the behavior in the organization is to cover up for
any safety hazards and incidents. A reactive culture only gets involved in safety
matters when there is an accident to be handled. A calculative culture has systems in
place that deal with safety issues such as policies and regulations. A proactive culture
anticipates the hazards, establishes preventive measures in course, and has a policy to
deal with any unavoidable safety issues. As DePasquale & Geller (1999) allude, the
generative culture is behavior based. It encourages behaviors that enhance a positive
safety culture. A positive safety culture is built. It should not only be based on
policies and regulations given to employees but should also be behavior oriented. An
effective safety culture involves commitment of all the stakeholders in the
organization. Everyone is to be clearly informed of its importance so that they take it
as their responsibility to maintain it. Employees are motivated towards encouraging
and enhancing safety, since in some cases they see it as the responsibility of the
management to ensure safety.
Safety culture is based on behavior and behavioral attitudes. The existing
management uses tools that build on positive safety attitudes within organizations.
These attitudes eventually influence how the employees respond to the existing workculture, organizational goals, aims and focus. The management instills these
behaviors by providing adequate resources to handle safety issues. These resources
could include: protective gear, the need to demonstrate to employees that safety
culture is of mutual interest, in addition to setting an example, by behaving according
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to the expectations they have stated for the employees. The safety systems are flexible
and independent. A healthy safety system can withstand the face of change and still
remain effective. At times, the equipment may change, the employees or the
management may change but a robust safety continues. When flexible, the safety
system can be adjusted without inconvenience to the organization and the workforce
(DePasquale & Geller, 1999).
The safety culture is proactive, as Taieh (2012) suggests. It does not act only
when a safety crisis has emerged. A proactive culture perceives what is in store for the
future, placing the necessary measures both within and outside the organization, to
avoid safety crises. Its policies are clearly spelled out on how to handle crisis in case
it arises. This culture learns from its past experiences and other organizations, so as to
avoid a repeat of the crisis. The safety culture is fair, just and goal-focused. In this
culture discipline is spelt out in a fair and even manner. Everyone bears responsibility
for the consequences of their own individual risky or reckless actions. A clear and just
discipline policy is formed, made known to the employees and followed when
required. Employees who engage in both individual and group support of a safetybased culture, are also fairly rewarded.
2.11 The Future of SMS and Culture in Aviation
As technology continues to advance by the day, the aviation industry needs to
keep up the pace. Awareness of the role of safety culture should be promoted among
all aviation organizations. This should be in line with modern safety advancements
(Taieh, 2012). Various organizations should come together and pool their safety data
results so as to identify the common issues affecting the industry. Safety culture
workshops should be encouraged among aviation organizations in order to enrich the
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involvement of stakeholders. An intervention and measurement tool should be put in
place, further being introduced to the industry arena. This would facilitate the
identification of existing frailties, while marking areas requiring improvement
(Eurocontrol, 2006).
However many definitions of culture there may be, any definition that captures
its holistic nature of bringing together all beliefs and values across an organization
will provide the most suitable definition. Both SMS and organizational safety culture
do adequately and effectively complement each other. As Hale (2003) alludes, a
working safety culture is characterized by being not only informed, but also just, fair
and flexible. These features enable a smooth integration of safety culture in the
industry. Safety culture and SMS perform important roles ranging from establishing
norms, to reducing injuries and accidents. To better understand how safety culture
works in existing organizations, models are used. These models also indicate the
success position of the system. Due to the overwhelming success rates of safety
culture in the aviation industry, SMS should be supported embracing SMS and safety
culture in the future. The sky is the limit for the achievement of occurrences of
accidents and incidences.
2.12 Proposed Hypotheses and Research Questions.
The aviation program‟s Safety Management Systems (SMS) can only be
improved by the creation of a Just Culture within the university‟s program. Through
fine-tuning of reporting methods, as well as the establishment of a blame-free
environment, will allow overall improvements. This is in the SMS of the program,
such as Midwest aviation training programs, and the improvement of the safety
culture of the system as a whole. Oversight, with regard to the just culture program,
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may need to be streamlined and adjusted, based on the skills of the university‟s
students and technical staff presents (Hale, 2003). This paper therefore aims at
establishing a clear system of safety culture in the aviation industry taking into
consideration the existing just and blame cultures environment that exist in general in
most of aviation industries. It hopes to give a solution to the existent blame culture.
Hence, the researcher with the support and believe of those norms and principles that
were said and alluded by the great scientists and psychologists of the aviation safety
industry and just culture; will try to dig deep into those questions that have been used
for the survey and use them as a row material for the study conducted and try to look
for answers of questions like: Did the participant have a view that top managers have
a genuine goal of zero mishaps? And as the fact, that the production goals and safety
issues can come into conflicts; so Did UND measure in place to recognize and solve
such conflicts in an effective and open manner? Also how affective those policies that
put by UND Aerospace in encouraging everyone to raise safety- related issues? Or
Did UND Aerospace has a safety reporting system that is clear confidential and nonpunitive? Also Did UND Aerospace disciplinary policies base on an agreed
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behavior? Did this recognize by
everyone that small proportion of unsafe acts were indeed intentional and reckless and
warrant punishment, but that the large majority of such acts are not intentional and
should not attract punishment?
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Chapter Three: Methodology
3.0 Introduction
As mentioned before, the questionnaire included thirty eight questions; the researcher
here only focused on and exercised those questions that might relate to Just Culture
and SMS in general, some of those questions are:
Q1. Gender: Male or Female.
Q2. Age:
Q3. What is your current academic year? (a.Freshman, b. sophomore, c. Junior, d.
Senior, e. Graduate)
Q4. What is your primary major? (Example: if your major in both ATC and Airport
Management, but hope to become a controller for the FAA select ATC).
Answers: a. Commercial Aviation, b. Commercial Aviation- Helicopter, c. Air Traffic
Controller, d. Aviation Management, e. Flight Education, f. Aviation Technology
Management, g. unmanned Aircraft Systems, h. Airport Management, i. Major
outside of the Aviation Department.
Q5. If you completed a semester of college, what is your Grade Point Average (GPA).
Q30. Score your safety culture: Please state your level of agreement in regards to the
following statement.
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Question 30:

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Many. Top managers at UND have a genuine
goal of zero Mishaps.
UND Aerospace understands that production
goals and safety issues can come into
conflict. At UND we have measures in place
to recognize and resolve such conflicts in an
effective and open manner.
UND Aerospace has policies that are in place
to encourage Everyone to raise safety-related
issues.
UND Aerospace has a safety reporting
system that is clearly Confidential and nonpunitive.
UND Aerospace disciplinary Policies are
based on an agreed distinction between
acceptable and unacceptable behavior. It is
recognized by everyone that a small
proportion of unsafe acts are indeed
intentional and reckless and warrant
punishment, but that the large majority of
such acts are not Intentional and should not
attract punishment.

Also a copy of complete thirty eight questions questionnaire has attached in the end of
the

thesis.
This methodology aimed at assessing and addressing the Safety Management

Systems (SMS) of the Midwest Aviation Training Program Aerospace program.
Questionnaires were the chosen instrument for data collection, with the questions
focusing on the safety culture within the program. Flight instructors and students were
the respondents representing the sample for the study. The questions listed in the
questionnaires included the participants‟ age, gender, year of study, career goals, and
the policies associated with the aviation policy. The questions about policy issues
were based on a Likert scale, which indicated a strong or partial agreement or
disagreement. The questionnaire addressed the current SMS and potential issues they
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face based on the responses provided. The paper also addressed the strengths and
weaknesses of the SMS standards at the collegiate program aforementioned.
Safety culture is fundamentally important for the success of any aviation
program, and safety culture is inextricably linked to a just culture within the program.
Without the transparency of the just culture, a true safety culture within an aviation
program cannot exist. Through the utility of the creation of Just Culture and the
various implementation methods discussed in this proposal, a culture of safety and
openness within the Midwest aviation training program aerospace program were
established and analyzed (Helmreich, & Merritt, 1998). The continual re-analysis of
SMS within the aviation program is fundamental to the maintenance of high standards
of safety (Helmreich, & Merritt, 1998).
In order to address the Safety Management Systems (SMS) of Midwest
aviation training program‟s aviation program, questionnaires were produced. These
were towards asking flight instructors, as well as students, about the overall safety
culture within the program. The questionnaire addressed the current SMS, and the
potential issues that the SMS faces based on the responses flight instructors and
students of aviation.
3.1 Assumptions and Limitations
The author assumed the following during data collection: - that all the flight
instructors have adequate knowledge about the program and that the program affects
all of them in an equal measure. In addition, there was the aspect of students not
having complete knowledge of the program, and pertinent aspects involved. The
paper also assumed that all the administered questionnaires will be returned within the
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stipulated period, having been adequately responded to. Another limitation was a lack
of adequate responses and answering, on the side of the respondents. The use of
questionnaires as the preferred tool for collecting data, however, had several
limitations. One is the low rate of response associated with them. Some participants
never returned the questionnaires even upon follow-ups, compromising the findings
of study.
A researcher also could not explain questions to the respondents, therefore,
limiting the eventual understanding by respondents. Therefore, the participants may
misinterpret the questions they deem difficult, thereby compromising the desired
outcome (Bradburn, Sudman, & Wansink, 2004). The use of questionnaires does limit
researchers in terms of assessing the respondents‟ emotions and expressions when
answering the questionnaire. As a researcher, this author may need to probe the
respondent further so as to establish their perspective of a given issue. For example,
on sensitive questions; a questionnaire does limit them in such case. The author,
therefore, will take note of these limitations before evaluating the returned
questionnaires.
3.2 Data Collection
The author will focus on questionnaires conducted in the Midwest aviation
training program, called students‟ survey. This will be conducted every 2 years. The
paper will try to scope the questions and the data that relate to „Just Culture and SMS‟
issues using 2013 student data survey. The questionnaire is identical; with each
questionnaire containing thirty-eight questions. The Midwest aviation training
program researchers posed a wide range of questions based around SMS culture to
verify the issues it faces, in addition to identifying ways of improving the safety
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culture. The questionnaire, therefore, is semi-structured, with different parts covering
specified questions. They contain both open and close-ended questions. Some of the
SMS‟ elements addressed, through the questions include safety organization, safety
services, reporting, and infrastructure. The questions generally address the current and
potential issues that the SMS, as a vital component of aviation safety measures, faces.
The rationale behind the choice of the questionnaire as the instrument for data
collection is the amount of information that is collectable using one. A questionnaire
enables a researcher collect a variety of information about their topic of interest
(Baker, 2006). The use of questionnaires in this research, for example, will provide a
wide range of information regarding the SMS of the college aviation program.
Questionnaires also promote reliability and validity, as the number of researchers or
individuals conducting such a study, does not affect its overall reliability (Bradburn,
Sudman, & Wansink, 2004). The use of questionnaires will also be cost effective as
they only require formulation and administration to the respondents, with the
necessary waiting time, for the respondents to return them.
Questionnaires are tools that facilitate accuracy during data analysis. This is
informed by the fact that data collected through a questionnaire can be analyzed using
scientific objectives as compared to other data collection techniques. The comparison
of findings of such a study with similar works is possible using a questionnaire. This
is because it presents distinct responses from the participants present (Bradburn,
Sudman, & Wansink, 2004). Researchers, therefore, can use questionnaires to
measure change in related studies. Questionnaires provide the participant adequate
time to respond to the questions because a researcher has no room for probing. A
researcher can also use questionnaires to draw a representative sample especially
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when the population under study is large. This makes them more reliable when
compared to other techniques such as interviews.
As the researcher, the author intends to issue follow-up cards to respondents
who will not have mailed back the questionnaires requesting them to do so. Through
this, the author will seek to minimize the low response rate problem associated with
the questionnaires provided. The structure of the questions will be simplified to
facilitate better and easier understanding amongst the targeted respondents. This
minimizes the misinterpretation limitation common, with the utility of the
questionnaires. This paper will also follow a shortened format for all questions
present while avoiding using many ambiguous questions. These ambiguous questions
can compromise the eventual outcome of the study, as it may not yield the expected
results.
3.2.1 Administration of Questionnaires
The first step towards administrating the questionnaires is informing the
participants about the aims of the study in question. This motivated the respondents to
answer these questions and return the questionnaires on time. The author informed
them about the benefits they stand to reap from participating in the study. This is
because the findings will be used to compare the program to another one conducted.
The paper thereafter provided a diagnosis of the problems with the program in focus,
and offered pertinent recommendations. At this stage, the study also assured the
participants of the confidentiality of the information they provide in the
questionnaires. The second step regarded the physical issuance of the questionnaires
to the selected sample group. The questionnaires were inclusive of a timeline, within
which participants were expected to return them. The respondents, who will not have
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returned the questionnaires within the stipulated period, will receive follow-up cards
requesting them to mail them to the researcher, as soonest possible.
3.3 Sampling Technique
Flight instructors, as well as Midwest aviation training program students, will
provide the sample group for this study. This project was reviewed and approved by
the UND Institutional Review Board. The research study will utilize the random
sampling technique, so to select the participants for the study. This is because this
technique provides all the respondents with an equal chance of selection. The random
sampling method is representative in nature. Thus, the findings regarding the sample
group‟s characteristics, as obtained from data analysis, will be generalized to the
population present (Baker, 2006). The author intends to use a sample of a hundred
individuals, so as to generate a wide range of information regarding the topic in focus.
Flight instructors within the aviation station, as well as students in the Midwest
aviation training program‟s aviation program, will be informed of the study, and the
selected respondents issued with questionnaires. The timeline for returning the
questionnaires provided, is a month after which the author will analyze the collected
data and responses.
3.4 Data Analysis and Result
The author observed ethical considerations during data analysis. First, names
of participants are not be revealed during analyses, as the paper uses the information
provided, purely for research. The research apply reasonable precautions to ensure
that the analysis does not pose negative implications upon the participants .The
analysis process will entail the documenting, sorting, interpreting of data and
evaluation of models present. As the researcher, the author will identify, sort, and
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classify popular phrases used by the respondents in the questionnaires to ease the
analysis. The paper will evaluate, compare, and interpret responses for the chosen
questions before the actual analyses. The responses to the close-ended questions, for
example, will be classified in the same group and the open-ended in another.
Hypotheses tests will also be conducted to prove the validity of the various
hypotheses formulated.
This analysis is based on the responses generated through questionnaires. From the
questionnaires given out, and the responses provide, varying issues are observable.
First and foremost is that there is present, a trend where more males than females did
respond. This is exemplified by the 90% response of 391 male participants, as
opposed to 42 female participants, which equates to only 10 percent. The total number
of responses was 433 individuals, making the random sample adequate for the
research study. This is shown in the graph, Figure 1.
Graph of Male Respondents vs. Female Respondents
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The 90% response of 391 male
participants, as opposed to 42
female participants, which equates
to only 10%

Figure 1- Gender Radio of Respondents
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The number of respondents, as per the given statistics is roughly approximated
at 430 for each gender group, with the total number being estimated at 860 overall.
Regarding the age bracket of all student respondents, the average age is at 22, as
provided from the existing data. The minimum age present is at 18 years, while the
maximum is at 35 years. 427 individuals did respond. This is provided in Figure 2.

The Average Age Group of Respondents
121

Number of Students

101
81
61
41
21
1
Age Age Age Age Age Age Age Age Age Age Age Age Age Age Age Age
55 38 35 32 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18

Age of sutdents

Figure 2- The Average Age of Respondents
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Regarding the current year of study, with regard to the student respondents, a
majority were in the senior class, with the sophomore class producing the second
highest responses. Following was that of freshman students, with junior students
having the fourth lowest response. Lastly is the presence of 3 Graduate respondents,
who comprise 1% of total respondents. This is provided in the pie chart, Figure 3.

Respondents' grade during survey participation

114
66
Freshman

Junior
Sophomore

161

83

Senior

3

Graduate

Figure 3- Respondents by Class/ Level of Study

The total responses, regarding the above were 427.
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Regarding the respondents‟ fields of study, with a focus on their primary
majors, varying results were achieved. Individuals majoring in Commercial Aviation
provided the most response, with 215 individuals providing 50% of total responses
gained. Air Traffic Control provided the next largest number, with 119 individuals
comprising 28% of all respondents. Those in Unmanned Aircraft systems provided
the next largest category, with 31 respondents signifying 7% of all individuals.
Following closely, were the 21 Aviation Management students who responded,
comprising 5% of all respondents. Students majoring in Commercial Aviation –
Helicopters, followed at 4%, with 16 respondents in total. Airport Management
students followed at 2%, with 8 individuals responding. The rest shared the 1% mark,
with 6 respondents being from Flight Education; 4 from Aviation Technology
Management, and 6 from other majors outside the university‟s (Midwest aviation
training program) Aviation Department. This is represented in the graph, Figure 4.
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Figure 4- Respondents As Categorized By the Individual Fields of Study: Their Majors
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The total number of respondents was 426, with the study‟s Standard Deviation
value being 2.04. The Variance value was at 4.17, with the mean of the response
being at 2.53. The minimum value stood at 1, with the maximum value being 9.
Concerning respondent‟s answers to their Grade Point Average (GPA),
varying results were acquired. The number of total responses was 346 individuals,
who had points ranging from 4.0 (the highest) to 2.56 being the lowest point
indicated. A total of 346 individuals responded accordingly. This is represented in
Figure 5.
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Figure 5- Representative of the Grade Point Average (GPA) mark
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Regarding the various responses based on the participants‟ score on safety
culture, varying results were achieved. From the 10 different questions posed,
indicators highlight a general agreement by the participating students. Total responses
also did vary from one question to the next, with the average number of respondents
to the questions provided being approximately 388 individuals. A minority section of
all the respondents was of the view that the safety culture present was not satisfactory,
with a sizeable group viewing the questions as not being applicable in their case.
On the issue of commitment to aviation safety and the provision of adequate
resources, the Dean, Director of Flight Operations and the Chair of Academics had
178 respondents agreeing strongly, with 167 students being in general agreement. 11
individuals somewhat disagreed to the above, with 2 being in disagreement, while 7
were in strong disagreement to the aforementioned output. 24 individuals‟ responses
were indicated not applicable which have not counted. This is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6- Aviation Safety and the Provision of Adequate Resources

The total number of respondents was 366 individuals, with the Standard
Deviation being at 0.752 and the Variance stood at 0.566, with the Mean being at 4.39
points.
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On the aspect of discussed issues related to safety at the various Midwest aviation
training program aerospace meetings and classes, on a regular basis, and not after an
incident or accident, varying responses were obtained. Those in strong agreement
were 161 individuals, with 162 others being in general agreement. 28 individuals did
somewhat disagree, with 13 individuals being in disagreement to the aforementioned.
Those strongly in disagreement were 8, while 19 respondents indicated not applicable.
This is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7- Discussed Issues Related To Safety at the Various Aviation Training Program Aerospace Meetings and
Classes.

The total number of respondents was 372 individuals, with the Standard
Deviation being at 0.891 and the Variance stood at 0.794, with the Mean being at 4.22
points.
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Regarding the issue of the primary goals of identifying the „why and what failed‟, as
opposed to „failed‟, in the event of an accident, various responses were obtained.
Those in strong agreement to midwest aviation training program‟s role were 178, with
162 individuals being in general agreement. 15 individuals were somewhat in
disagreement, with 10 respondents being in disagreement. 8 respondents on their part
did strongly disagree, with 28 individuals having responded with not applicable that
will be not calculated. So the total is 373. This is shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8- The Primary Goals of Identifying the ‘Why and What Failed’, As Opposed To ‘Who Failed’, In The
Event Of an Accident

The total number of respondents was 391, with the Standard Deviation being
at 0.847 and the Variance stood at 0.718 points, with the Mean value being 4.32
points.
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On the issue of midwest aviation training program aerospace regularly
identifying the most urgent safety concerns and subsequently carrying out effective
preventive actions, varied responses were received. Those strongly in agreement to
the aforementioned were 137, with those in general agreement being more; being 194.
15 were somewhat in disagreement, with 4 respondents being in general
disagreement. Those strongly in disagreement to the aforementioned, were 9, and
those recording not applicable being 31 individuals but will not be calculated. This is
shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9- Aviation Programs and Aerospace Regularly Identifying the Most Urgent Safety Concerns and
Subsequently Carrying Out Effective Preventive Actions

The total number of respondents was 359, with the Standard Deviation being
0.799. The Variance was recorded at 0.639, with the Mean value being 4.24.
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The issue of the Dean, Director of Flight Operations, and the Chair of
Academics feeling that a single incident or accident is one too many, varied responses
were obtained. The issue of the leadership at the Midwest Aviation Training Program
having a genuine goal of zero mishaps elicited the following as recorded in Figure
10.
The total number of individuals was 355, with those strongly in agreement
being 167. Those in general agreement were 160, with individuals somewhat in
disagreement being 15 in total. 3 individuals were in general disagreement, with 10
being strongly in disagreement. 32 individuals, on their part, indicated not applicable
(Figure 10).
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Figure 10- Dean, Director of Flight Operations, And the Chair of Academics Feeling That a Single Incident or
Accident Is One Too Many, In Addition To the Issue of the Leadership also have a Genuine Goal of Zero
Mishaps.

The Standard Deviation stood at 0.835, with the Variance being at 0.697 The
Mean of this specific response stood at the 4.32 point mark.
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On the issue of the frequency and a wide range of attendees to various safety
related meetings, by Midwest Aviation Training Program Aerospace staff, a variety of
responses were obtained Those who responded in strong agreement were 118 in total,
with those in general agreement being more, at 181 in total. Respondents somewhat in
disagreement were 21, with those in general disagreement being 4 in total. 7
individuals did respond with a strongly in disagreement stance, with 57 individuals
indicating not applicable. This is as shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 11- The Issue of the Frequency and Wide Range of Attendees to Various Safeties Related Meetings, By
UND Aerospace Staff.

The total number of respondents stood at 331, with the Standard Deviation
being 0.78. Variance was at the 0.618 value point with the Mean value being 4.21.
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The issue of Midwest aviation training program‟s aerospace program
understanding that production goals and safety issues can at times be in conflict,
varying responses were gained. Respondents had differing opinions of whether the
program had pertinent measures in place towards recognizing and subsequently
resolving such conflicts in both an open and effective manner. A total of 358
individuals did respond, with those strongly in agreement being 115 in total. 200
respondents were in general agreement, with 18 somewhat in disagreement, and 10
being in general disagreement. Those strongly in disagreement were 15 in total, with
27 responding with the not applicable phrase. This is shown in Figure 12.
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Figure 12- The Issue of UND’s Aerospace Program Understanding That Production Goals and Safety Issues Can
At Times Be in Conflict.

The Standard Deviation stood at the 0.925, with the Variance being at the .855
valuation point. The Mean average value on its part was at 4.09.
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Regarding whether the Midwest Aviation Training Program Aerospace
program had policies in place, towards encouraging everyone to raise individual and
group safety-related issues, the respondents provided varying answers. A total of 370
individuals responded, with 177 of these being strongly in agreement. 168
respondents were in general agreement, with 12 being somewhat in disagreement. 5
respondents were in general disagreement, with 8 respondents strongly disagreeing to
the aforementioned. Those indicating the not applicable clause were 18 in total. This
is shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13- Regarding Whether the UND Aerospace Program Had Policies in Place, Towards Encouraging
Everyone to Raise Individual and Group Safety-Related Issues.

The Standard Deviation was at the 0.797 valuation point, with the Variance
standing at the 0.636 mark. The Mean valuation was at the 4.35 mark.
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On the issue of Midwest Aviation Training Program‟s Aerospace program
having a safety reporting system, which is clearly both confidential and non-punitive
in nature, differing responses were obtained. 355 individuals responded, with 172
being strongly in agreement. Those in general agreement were 149 in total, with 20
individuals being in general agreement. 2 respondents were in general disagreement,
with 12 individuals being strongly in disagreement. Those who responded with the
not applicable clause were 31 in total which will not be calculated. This is shown in
Figure 14.
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Figure 14- The Issue of UND Program’s Aerospace Program Having a Safety Reporting System, Which Is Clearly
Both Confidential and Non Punitive in Nature.

The Standard Deviation mark was at 0.878, with the Variance range being at
0.770 valuation point. The Mean point was at the 4.32 mark.
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Finally, on the issue pertaining to the Midwest aviation training program
aerospace disciplinary policies being based on an agreed distinction; between
unacceptable and acceptable behavior, varying results were gained. Whether it was
recognized by all that a minor segment of unsafe acts were indeed intentional and
often reckless in nature was duly questioned. The majority of such misbehavior were
not intentional and hence did not merit punitive measures was also put into focus. 358
individuals responded, with those strongly in agreement, with the aforementioned
standing at 135. Those in general agreement however were more being 188. Those
somewhat in disagreement were 25 in overall, with 2 individuals being generally in
disagreement. 8 respondents were in strong disagreement, with 29 individuals having
responded with the not applicable clause. This is shown in Figure 15.
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Figure 15- The Issue Regarding the UND Aerospace Disciplinary Policies Being Based On an Agreed Distinction;
Between Unacceptable and Acceptable Behavior.

Standard Deviation stood at the 0.787 valuation mark, with the Variance being
at the 0.620 mark. The Mean value was at the 4.23 mark.
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3.5 Data Reporting
The findings from the data analysis will be reported and explained in this
section. A decision rule will be used to explain the choice to reject or not reject the
null hypotheses that there is no variation between the mentioned variables, and there
is no single variable is unlike zero. Additionally, the decision rule will be generated to
describe the implications of the choices made, with regard to the proposed
hypotheses. Those who will not have responded to questions will be considered as a
null, and thereby, will not be included in the diagram calculations.
Figures and charts utilized above are helpful in interpreting and subsequently
reporting the analyzed data. The charts, figures and graphs are carefully labeled to
facilitate better understanding. The results of the analysis aid in better comparison of
the SMS program with that of a similar-sized one. From the findings, the researcher
has deduced that more respondents were males, with this being represented by 90% as
compared to 10% female respondents. Furtherance is that sophomore and freshman
year students carried the bulk of the study‟s respondents, with their ages averaging on
the 23-year mark. The individuals majoring in Air Traffic Control and Commercial
Aviation did also provide the bulk of the sampled respondents. Regarding the
respondents‟ GPA, these ranged from 4.0, to the 2.5 mark, with a majority being
between the 2.8 mark and the 3.5 mark average.
Regarding the Midwest aviation training program‟s aerospace
program‟s implementation of the SMS program, the result was positive as a majority
of respondents was either in agreements or strongly in agreement. The minority were
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in disagreement, both in general or strongly against, with a sizeable portion indicating
the not applicable option. This proves that the program is adequately implemented,
with positive results being present. However, the sizeable number of respondents,
providing less than adequate answers provides a pointer to the need for better
implementation of the same. The effects on overall aviation safety standard, within
the Midwest aviation training program‟s aerospace program are according to the
researcher‟s view, and as backed up by data provided, adequate. The positive output
does portray a sense of satisfaction on the students‟ side, with regard to overall
aviation safety standards. However, room exists for more enhancements regarding the
aforementioned program.
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CHAPTER Four: Findings, Analysis and Recommendation
This section of the research paper aims at discussing and analyzing some of
the findings on just culture. Before the 21st century, very few people had heard about
Just culture. Currently, almost every organization in the aviation industry has
implemented the just culture in all their activities. Recent findings have suggested
that; the just culture has become the foundation for safety in the aviation industry
(Frazier, 2012). Organization leaders have to focus at achieving a just culture in the
firm so that the business can benefit from the simplicity, power and effectiveness of
the culture; Therefore, The researcher think that studying Just Culture, Safety
Management System (SMS) and Human Error classes at UND is a very clear answer
for the question of “Did the participant have a view that top managers have a genuine
goal of zero mishaps?” which UND management are trying to educate their student
despite of their stages about the idea of just culture and how this affect the safety.
This is also supported by the results that showed in (figure 11) that the majority
agreed with the issues of the frequency and wide range of attendees to various safety
related classes and meetings.
There are several activities whereby the degree of professionalism required is
so high such that lack of high standards may lead to serious consequences. Failure to
perform in accordance with set standards may be enough to justify dismissal, as there
has to be a balance between the productions and safety, Therefore the researcher
pondered that this has positively explained at UND in the same according to the
(figure 12) there are still some participants who disagreed and the writer believes that
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this need more review by the UND authorities so as to get a clear picture of what
made that disagreement.
Based on the fact mentioned in these papers, the researcher believes that
unprofessional conduct within the aviation industry may have a significant impact on
safety and organizational growth. Also most researchers define unprofessional
conduct as any act that involves moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption. There are
several cases in the aviation industry that involves unprofessional conduct such as the
misrepresentation of materials in obtaining a license.
Common errors that can be attributed to unprofessional conduct include
incompetence, negligence and sometimes malpractice. These types of misconducts
often result in injury to both the pilot and passengers. In some cases, misconduct
creates an unreasonable risk that a passenger or the pilot may be harmed. Therefore, it
is significant that reporting or making policies that encourage

everyone in the

aviation industry to raise safety and report about safety issues should be prioritized,
subsequently the writer believes that UND has hit that target and this is also supported
by the data presented in (Figure 13) too, and the writer based on that data has a strong
believe that he got an answer for the question “how affective those policies that put by
UND Aerospace in encouraging everyone to raise safety- related issues?”
Currently, organizations within the aviation industry have realized the
importance of educating their employees about just culture. Just culture aids
professionals in understanding and accepting the ubiquity of human error and the
industry is continuously surrounded by risks. Studies have suggested that lack of an
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understanding on human errors and risks limits organizational growth (Fernández,
Montes-Peón, &Vázquez-Ordás, 2007).
Hence, the writer trusts that the data gathered in this paper implies that, just
culture prepares professionals in understanding and appropriately responding to
outcomes and events that may be unexpected. Education in just culture should
become mandatory in all disciplines in aviation education. The knowledge and
application of just culture principle may soon become one of the most important
building blocks for the aviation industry.
In additional to reporting, the researcher believes that another fundamental procedure
to lead to a just culture is to have a good data analysis and data management in place;
to obtain that also we should have a non-punitive and confidential environment that
can free and encourage everyone to report about safety issues. Thus the researcher
believes that based on the data presented in (figure 14), UND has very clearly
responded to the question of “Did UND Aerospace has a safety reporting system that
is clear confidential and non-punitive?” as majority of the students positively agreed
with the reporting and data handling procedure in UND.

In most cases, aviation safety training, system design and processes are very complex.
The aviation industry is also a high-risk area that requires systematic change.
Enterprise risk management and change management systems may be put in place to
reduce the likelihood of loss in case unforeseen risk occurs.
Learning from mistakes can be costly and sometimes the organization may fail
to get back on its feet. The researcher has found that there is an underlying need for
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organizations to learn from accidents, and incidents through safety investigations so
that they can take the appropriate actions. This approach plays a critical role in
preventing the repetition of such events in the future. This is also will very
unmistakably help to distinct between acceptable and unacceptable behavior and will
obviously lead to distinguish between intentional and non-intentional and reckless
actions; It is very significant for an environment to exist where occurrences are
reported and where all the necessary processes are already in place for investigations.
After the investigations are completed, so the researcher believes that the organization
should shift its focus on developing preventive measures such as re-training or
increasing the level of supervision.
Departments such as the air traffic control, pilots or vehicle drivers are legally
bound to report any occurrence or incident. Several task forces have been created
within the aviation industry. Most of these tasks forces have found out that punishing
air traffic controllers and pilots with fines or suspending their licenses might have led
to a reduction in the reporting of incidents and sharing of safety information. Different
tasks forces have recognized the need for an active culture that encourages honest
reporting and one that has not yet been reconciled with the legislative powers or the
judicial system.
For this reason, the researcher has faith in the data presented in (figure 15) that in
answer for the question of “Did this recognize by everyone that small proportion of
unsafe acts were indeed intentional and reckless and warrant punishment, but that the
large majority of such acts are not intentional and should not attract punishment?”
UND has a positive level of agreement and the majority of the students are agree with
that; in the meantime more investigations and studies needed by UND authorities to
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know why some participants are disagreed despite of their small numbers. This can be
achieved by involving those students‟ opinions or their participations in the general
UND safety plans and procedures.
The benefits of creating a just culture are numerous. The researcher has
confidence in that for organizations to enjoy these benefits, they first have to embrace
just culture. One of the first steps an organization can take is to increase the rate at
which reports are made. This approach is more useful when previously unreported
events are identified and their trends investigated. This offers risk managers with an
opportunity to address latent safety challenges that may come in the future.
According to the conservative's estimates, for each major accident, which
involves fatalities, there are as many as several hundred unreported incidents.
Researchers have suggested that, if these incidents are properly investigated, they
might identify underlying problems on time and prevent future incidents from taking
place again. Lack of reported events does not necessarily indicate a safe operation
(Dekker, 2012). Likewise, increased reporting on events does not indicate a decrease
in the level of safety. Even reporting illuminates the potential safety concerns an
organization has. Increased reporting should be seen as a healthy, safety indicator
(Eurocontrol, 2006).
Another approach that the researcher believes in that can be used to create just
culture within the organization is building trust. Organizational leaders and managers
should focus at establishing behaviors that are acceptable. Also, the process of
building trust if done correctly can bring different members together within the
organization that can often have infrequent contact in policy and decision-making.
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Increased trust within the organization is critical in creating a just culture. Trust
results into a general understanding of where the lines are drawn for disciplinary
actions. Therefore, trust is at the core in the development of a just culture.
Trust assist in establishing a just culture that is well defined and well
monitored (DePasquale, 1999). Trust also assists all members within the organization
to do better, as well as, define their individual responsibilities. Through trust building,
organizational leaders can influence and motivate others within the company.
Organizations should shift their focus to trust building to increase the confidence of
front line employees in their superiors.
The researcher imagines another approach that can be taken in creating a Just
culture, is implementing a more effective safety and operational management system.
It is often expected that a just culture will enhance the overall effectiveness of an
organization. This will be done by defining job performance expectations and
establishing clear guidelines for the consequences of deviance from procedures.
Managers can focus at creating more effective safety and operational management
system to allow the organization identify and report on any emerging trends
(Antonsen, 2009). Such systems can also assist the organization determine whether
violations are taken place, as well as, identify any deviations from procedures that are
already established.
Effective systems can spot organizational structures that are outdated or
ineffective. Such systems are often identified as operational inefficiencies, lost
opportunities or safety lapses. The major motive behind creating effective systems
within organizations is safety. The author strongly agrees with researchers‟ suggestion
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that, factors that contribute to accidents also create production losses, quality and cost
problems. Organizations within the aviation industry should focus at creating
a constructive Just culture. This shift would be expected to have tangible benefits that
can contribute positively to the overall safety culture of an organization (Behm,
2004).
The researcher in this section also offers more recommendations on some of
the steps an organization can take to create a just culture. It will also outline potential
obstacles that may hinder an organization from implementing a just culture. The first
step to be taken for consideration is the legal aspect of just culture. An organization
has to have in place a disciplinary framework that supports reporting of incidents.
This will significantly reduce any legal impediments to reporting. The first significant
step in changing the legal aspects may entail substantiating the current legal situation
and establishing whether it needs to be changed.
The step that mentioned by the researcher in creating a just culture is reporting
organizational policy and procedures. This step is very important because it considers
safety issues concerning the underlying reporting structure and company commitment.
Also another important step is selecting the reporting method to be used. Some of the
issues the organization may consider with regard to the method by which reports are
collected are the rapid, usefulness and intelligible feedback of the reporting
community. The organization should also consider the ease at which reports are
generated. This is because; voluntary reporting is often perceived an extra task
(Bayuk, 2007). Therefore, the organization will require a clear and unambiguous
direction for reporting and accessing to reports.
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In the aviation industry, some of the first steps in developing a just culture
might include deciding on whether to have a voluntary or a mandatory reporting
system. The organization should put in place a team who will be tasked with the
responsibility of implementing a just culture. This team should comprise of the
following members: the safety and operations manager, human researchers manager,
risk manager, employees and the organization's stakeholders. And the author further
suggests that UND needs to involve any one that wants to get involved voluntarily in
creating just culture or in safety issues as whole, then selected team should conduct
further investigations with the operational team. This will assist in making informed
decisions on how reports can be investigated further. It is very important for the team
to decide on which reports that will be further investigated. This will allow UND to
organize the reports in an orderly manner. Those reports that are more severe are
given more priority.
Also the researcher recommends that just culture is the key to successful
implementation of safety regulations. This culture creates a reporting environment
within aviation organizations, as well as, regulators and investigating authorities. A
reporting culture often depends on how organizations handle blame and punishment.
The researcher is strongly agrees that according to research, only small proportions of
human actions that are unsafe are deliberate, and therefore, require to be sanctioned.
Also research has showed that amnesty on all unsafe acts may lack credibility in the
eyes of employees and may even be seen to oppose natural justice. Therefore,
blameless culture may be undesirable.
Research data gathered and analyzed in this paper by the author suggest that,
safety analysis and investigations are necessary in improving safety. Organizations
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such as UND should have a continues process of ensuring that all the necessary
processes are in place for carrying out investigations and developing preventative
actions such as re-training and improved supervision. Also a nonstop attempt to create
an environment that can foster a just culture.
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Conclusion
In summary, this research project has discussed some of the ways in which the
top down nature of safety management systems may be used to create a just culture
within organizations in the aviation industry. Research data gathered in this paper has
considered several aspects of a safety culture in aviation management. The research
has also suggested some of the strategies for a just culture that can be designed and
implemented. In the aviation industry, safety is regarded as the reduction of overall
risk levels. Organizations in the aviation industry aim at having the lowest levels of
risk.
In this research paper, just culture is a new development in management
theory especially in corporate workplaces. In the past, workplaces operated under the
mutual understanding that employees will not inform or report to authorities, as well
as, management about situations and conditions that required improvement. This
research paper has showed that, in some cases, these conditions and situations may be
irritating to workers. However, in other cases, these conditions at the workplace may
be actively dangerous to employees and the public. Reporting of errors will ensure
that they are addressed accordingly and prevented from taking place in the future.
The researcher has used a questionnaire that has IRB approval by UND and
tried to analyze those data to go deep inside the just culture and its characteristics, and
use the answers of UND students as fundamental materials for discussions and
findings.
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